AI & JOBS

Will adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) prove to be a job killer or enhancer? This blog post addresses this question from three perspectives:

  • How the U.S. job base has adapted in the past to changes in technology, cultural and economic environment — an empirical exercise drawing on the experience of historically observed shifts away from agricultural and then manufacturing employment.

  • What these changes suggest for how employment in the future may occur with AI adaptation across a seemingly never ending realms of human endeavor — a more speculative undertaking albeit drawing on informed opinions of recognized research organizations.

  • How the U.S. might adapt to AI changing employment prospects in as-needed stair-step fashion — reflecting factors favoring full employment rather than net job displacement.

This overview analysis indicates that prior year transitions from agriculture and then from manufacturing resulted in their respective shares of U.S. employment dropping by about 3-5% points per decade. If this experience is applied to AI, it would suggest a pace of change that could be absorbed by offsetting job growth in tech-focused sectors of the economy.

If the pace of AI-driven change occurs more rapidly as some sources suggest, net results could be more de-stabilizing for American workers. Advance preparation for potential business, worker and regulatory mitigation should be considered sooner rather than later so that effective measures can be ready to go before the prospective negatives overwhelm market and/or regulatory capacities to effectively respond.

U.S. Economic Adaptation

Let’s begin by reviewing the fundamental changes that have occurred with employment in the U.S. over the last 150 years. In that period, the country has gone from agrarian to industrial to post-industrial.

Based on employment data available, the analysis is divided between two time periods:

  • 1870-1930 - from post Civil War reconstruction to a 1st world war and to onset of the Great Depression.

  • 1940-2020 — from economic recovery to a 2nd world war and to emergence of a baby boomer dominated culture.

1870-1930

As depicted by the following graph, the U.S. economy took off on a tear post-Civil War, increasing from what the U.S. Census Bureau defined as just under 13 million gainfully employed Americans in 1870 to approximately 49 million in 1930. This is close to a 4-fold increase and equates to an average 2.2% per year job growth rate.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau. Comparative Occupation Statistics: 1870-1830 (Part II).
As defined by the Census Bureau, total “gainful employment“ includes workers age 10 and above.

The number of gainfully employed workers went from less than 34% of nationwide population in 1870 to nearly 40% by 1930. Labor force participation was augmented by an increasing presence of women in the workforce as well as child labor.

Children ages 10-15 accounted for 1.75 million workers as of a 1900 peak — equating to about 6% of all U.S. employees. Women went from 15% of the employed workforce in 1870 to 22% by 2030.

From an occupational perspective, America was still a largely agrarian society in 1870 with agricultural workers accounting for over half (53%) of all jobs. As depicted by the following graph, 60 years later agriculture’s share of the gainfully employed was cut by more than half — to much reduced 21% share. This was due to introduction of labor saving innovations ranging from rural electrification to replacement of horses by petrol-powered farm equipment.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Averaged over this 60 year time frame as a share of total employment, ag-related jobs dropped by just over 5 percentage points per decade. With agriculture employment less dominant, employment growth shifted to other sectors of the U.S. economy.

Manufacturing went from 20% of U.S. employment in 1870 to 30% in 1920, then dropping somewhat to 29% in the depression year of 1930. Full uptake of the industrial revolution spread to other sectors of the economy — increasing from 27% of all jobs in 1870 to just under 50% in 1930. Major beneficiaries of this more diversified upsurge included transportation, trade, professional services plus what the Census termed as clerical occupations.

1940-2020

This period is bookended by a second world war at its outset, followed by steady economic growth (albeit also with cultural upheaval) and then more volatile years economically with entry into the 21st century. As illustrated by the following graph, U.S. non-farm employment increased from 32 million in 1940 to 142 million as of 2020 — a more than 4-fold increase over 8 decades.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey.
Note: BLS data sets use different definitions for the 1940-2020 period than for the earlier 1870-1930 Census Bureau data set and so are not directly comparable. CES data for the 1940-2020 time frame excludes farm employment. Separate BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data includes agriculture which as of 2022 now accounts for less than 1% of QCEW employment nationwide.

Even more importantly, the 8-decade period from World War II also marks the transition of a wartime and manufacturing led economy to a yet more diversified and service-focused job mix. The rate of job growth averaged 1.9% per year over this longer time period. This is somewhat below the 2.2% annual growth rate previously experienced as the nation was industrializing in part due to significant in-migration experienced from from 1870-1930 — albeit partially offset by increasing post-depression labor force participation over much of this most recent 80-year period.

Employment increased from 25% of population in 1940 to a peak of 47% in 2000, then dropped back over the next two decades to 43% as of 2020. As illustrated above, overall job growth also has stagnated over these past two most recent decades than previously from 1940-2000.

The post WWII era has not been kind to U.S. manufacturing — at least in terms of job share (as depicted by the graph below).

Manufacturing’s share of non-farm employment is now less than one third its share of employed workforce than in 1940 and 1950. From 31% of all jobs in 1940/50, manufacturing appears to have bottomed out a 9% share as of 2010/20 — equating to an average 3-4% point per decade drop in its share of non-farm jobs — but more stabilized this last decade from 2010-20. Uncertain is whether the current emphasis on re-shoring and shortened supply chains will prove to stem further domestic manufacturing employment erosion going forward.

A grouping of key service sectors stepped in to fill the void left by manufacturing’s reduced job share. Led by health care and professional services, all together these growth-oriented services have gone from 40% of non-farm employment in 1940/50 to peak out at 67-68% as of 2010/20. Other components of growth-oriented services include information, financial activities, leisure/hospitality and government.

All other sectors have stagnated in terms of job share, together declining from 29% to 24% of domestic employment over the 80 years from 1940-2020. These other slower growing sectors include natural resource extraction, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation together with warehousing and utilities.

Reconciling AI to Employment

With this historical background in hand, we now switch to the more futuristic consideration of potential AI impacts on U.S. (and global) employment in the decades ahead.

AI Categories

Two primary categories of AI are on the table as being utilized or considered currently and in the years immediately ahead:

  • Narrow AI (ANI) — as the most common form of AI currently, used for highly specialized systems designed and trained for specific task(s). Applications range from speech recognition to health diagnostics to autonomous driving.

  • Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) — currently a theoretical and not yet proven concept but a longer term goal of AI research covering any intellectual task that a human can perform.

A potential as yet more distant and hypothetical 3rd category of artificial intelligence is superintelligent AI (ASI) — popular in science fiction and as a philosophical concept — which in theory that could surpass human intelligence in every aspect.

Potential Employment Impacts of ANI Implementation

For purposes of addressing employment impacts immediately ahead, the current focus is on ANI.

Evaluations of potential AI job-related impacts have been conducted by a number of recognized public and private organizations in recent years. Forecast impacts drawn from nine representative studies are briefly summarized as follows — some specific to the U.S. and others offering a more sweeping international perspective:

U.S. Focused Studies:

  • Oxford University (2013) — estimated that about 47% of US jobs are at risk to automation, with occupations characterized by low education attainment and wages likely downsized due to the “probability of computerization.”

  • PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC/2017) — projecting that automation may impact 38% of U.S. jobs by the early 2030s with financial service jobs identified as most vulnerable short-term and transport jobs longer term.

  • Brookings Institution (2019) — projecting 18% of jobs are highly vulnerable to automation and that “better-paid, better educated workers face the most exposure.”

  • U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS/2022) — a detailed analysis of prior job changes but with no particular AI projected impact through this decade, albeit noting that prior projections of job losses have tended to overstate changes actually experienced.

Internationally Scoped Studies:

  • International Labor Organization (ILO/2016) — estimated 56% of all workers in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) are at risk of losing jobs over two decades with those in the garment industry especially vulnerable.

  • McKinsey Global Institute (MGI/2017) — estimated 400-800 million jobs will be displaced worldwide by 2030 (a 15-30% impact) — with half of of today’s work activities automated by about 2055.

  • World Economic Forum (WEF/2018) — with automation and AI displacing 75 million jobs with large multi-national firms by 2022 but more than offset by creation of 133 million new jobs .

  • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/2023) — currently estimating 27% of jobs in selected OECD countries of North America and Europe are in occupations at high risk of automation with particular focus on workers surveyed in finance and manufacturing.

  • Goldman Sachs (2023) — observing that the shift in workflows triggered by a new wave globally of AI systems could expose the equivalent of 300 million jobs to automation over the next decade, but with GDP increased by 7%.

Not surprisingly, these studies vary widely in their estimates of potential AI-related job losses. While some focus only on displacement, a few suggest that employment gains may more than offset reductions.

Time frames of analysis, geographic scope and methodologies also vary between studies. Researchers who focus on specific job tasks impacted by AI rather than more generalized occupational groupings tend to be associated with lesser levels of projected job displacement.

Some studies suggest that those most at risk of displacement are in lower paid occupations while others indicate major shifts ahead for professional and technical jobs. While these studies note a range of factors affecting the AI transition, there appears to be little to no emphasis on the ongoing value of human to human interaction as potentially mitigating job loss estimates.

As concluded by BLS in its 2022 analysis, “It is entirely possible that robotics and AI are simply another in a long line of waves of innovation whose effects on employment will unfold at rates comparable to those in the past.” If this proves to be the case with AI, at least for the U.S. it would suggest alignment with agricultural and manufacturing experience of a roughly 3-5% point job displacement factor per decade. This would equate to a range of perhaps 4.5-7.5+ million U.S. jobs displaced by AI-implementation per decade.

There are those who contend that job displacement with AI may be more rapid and profound than what has occurred with historical employment transitions — as with shifts away from agriculture and manufacturing employment. The probability of more severe AI displacement effects increases dramatically if applications shift more rapidly than expected from narrow AI (ANI) to human equivalent general AI (AGI).

Hurry Up & Slow Down

We conclude this review with summary observations leading to thoughts as to potential strategic response for “taming the AI tiger.”

Summary Observations

Three summary observations can be drawn from this review of forecast AI related employment impacts in the context of what is currently known about AI coupled with the experience of historically observed job shifts:

  • Over the last 150 years, the U.S. has experienced and ultimately adapted to dramatic changes in the composition of employment — going from an agricultural to manufacturing and then service based economy with AI now clearly taking shape as the next major wave of economic and cultural change.

  • While as-yet there is no consensus on the pace and composition of AI-related job shifts, prior U.S. experience suggests that the ANI era now underway can unfold incrementally over a multi-decade period — absorbed in ways that maintain full employment and increase GDP for improved quality of life. However, these beneficial outcomes are by no means guaranteed.

  • There is a distinct risk that AI roll-out could break with prior precedent especially if rapid implementation leads to job displacement that significantly exceeds offset opportunities. Economic and societal risks to humanity are significantly increased if the pace of AI innovation moves too quickly from ANI to AGI (or even more dramatically to ASI).

Taming the AI Tiger

The uncertainty surrounding positive versus negative outcomes of AI implementation suggests the imperative for a substantial if not radical change to the social contract between workers, employers and regulators. Most important will be the need for more flexible, adaptable and resilient mechanisms suitable for responding to both anticipated and unanticipated change.

Some responses to AI implementation can be expected to exacerbate net job displacement; others to focus on AI that favors full employment for those ready and willing to engage in gainful employment. Some mechanisms will be essentially market driven; others likely will require governmental or other regulatory intervention.

AI Implementation Resulting in Net Job Displacement

AI rollout that exacerbates the risk of net job displacement in conjunction with economic and social disruption could result from some combination of the following factors:

  • Rapid Market-Driven AI Rollout — especially by multi-national firms with industry set protocols together with minimal regulatory oversight.

  • Open Borders Migration & Free Trade — further incentivizing global competition and risk-taking.

  • Preference for Non-Human Interaction — reflecting potential changed social preferences except for low skilled, low wage employment not readily amenable to AI market penetration.

  • Subsidized ANI — if aimed primarily to further accelerate AI proliferation with minimal economic, equity and cultural guardrails.

  • Next Step AGI/ASI — with human-like robots and superintelligence leading to increasing AI control of economic and policy-making capability even before ANI is fully absorbed.

AI Implementation Favoring Full Employment

Conversely, there are potential market-based and regulatory mechanisms that can serve to favor full employment for those who continue to be labor force participants. These include:

  • Slowed Population & Labor Force Growth — as expected with reduced birth rates for the foreseeable future — fortuitously as a cushion to absorb potential for net AI-related job displacement and incent higher wage jobs.

  • Workforce Upskilling — continuous life-cycle training for AI-work integration.

  • Preference for Human Interaction — marketed to consumer desire for personal service over unfettered robot/bot interactions.

  • Employment Reshoring — with de-globalization at the cost of reducing labor productivity but maintaining key U.S. industries and associated jobs.

  • Governmental AI Regulation — aimed to match the pace of AI innovation with maintenance of full employment and social stability (and with carefully monitored R&D/commercialization of AGI/ASI).

  • Universal Basic Income (UBI) — as the end-all means offering fail-safe resources for workers displaced involuntarily or voluntarily with opportunity for individually determined artisanal entrepreneurship while retaining the incentive for gainful employment.

A Stair-Step Approach to Reconciling AI Implementation with Job Impacts

This blog post ends by suggesting a stair-step approach to recognizing and addressing AI effects in incremental step-by-step fashion, as needed. As illustrated by the following visual:

  • Going downstairs shows how AI may step-by-step result in ever more limited capacity to maintain full employment and income equity.

  • Conversely, the upstairs route depicts steps that might be considered and implemented to mitigate adverse impacts — supporting AI as a positive reinforcement to ever more gainful employment in a more prosperous world going forward.

Also illustrated with the graphic is the distinction between steps that are largely market-driven vis-a-vis regulatory and then those that reflect a hybrid market and regulatory approach.

Going upstairs need occur only to the extent that adverse job effects are being clearly experienced. Go only as far as needed at any point in time. But be prepared in advance so that effective measures can be ready to go before the prospective negatives overwhelm market and/or regulatory capacities to effectively respond.


This blog post has been prepared by from sources generally deemed to be reliable. However, accuracy is not guaranteed and information is subject to change without notice. Information regarding analysis of potential implications of AI for employment has involved use of material obtained from ChatGPT and Bing Chat inquiries, with separate fact checking conducted in preparation of this post.

HOW FAST & FAR SHOULD THE FED GO?

Note: this blog has been updated (most recently as of December 19, 2022) for more recent data since first posted on October 26, 2022.

The U.S. economy is in the midst of an unexpected and extraordinary inflationary spiral — peaking at a 9% rate of year-over-year annual inflation as of June 2022. Since World War II, this is exceeded only by inflationary peaks of 12.2% in 1972 (with the OPEC oil embargo) and 14.6% in 1980 (with the dot-com bubble).

After a prolonged period of near-zero interest rates set by the Federal Reserve, the Fed has now aggressively taken on the task of rapidly increasing the Fed Funds rate, with monthly rate increases of 0.25% points starting in March, increased to 0.50% in May, then with subsequent increases of 0.75% points in each of the months June, July, September and November — with a somewhat reduced 0.50% increase in December.

Prior projections indicated that the Fed anticipated its median target rate to be in the range of 4.6% by the end of 2023. With the December 2022 rate bump, the fed funds rate increased to 4.25-4.5% — with further increases now anticipated to reach a range of 5-5.5% in 2023.

The question is whether the Fed has been raising rates too fast — with risk of a hard landing and economic recession ahead in coming months. The opposing argument is that the Fed needs to move even more aggressively, before inflation rates of 9-10%+ per year get baked-in to the U.S. economy.

To help address this question, this blog post takes a look at the post-WWII experience of American inflation, the response of federal fund rates, and changes in economic performance (using the bellwether metric of unemployment rates). We look at two types of inflationary periods — those largely demand created and those reflecting supply shocks (including periods as at present reflecting a combination of demand and supply-side challenges).

Looking ahead, it is essential to recognize that the Fed has a limited set of monetary tools available. These tools are best suited to tackle the demand-side portion of the current inflation run-up — albeit dependent on reasonable domestic consensus for public fiscal as well as monetary restraint. Supply-side constraints are largely beyond the Fed’s direct purview but will depend on addressing supply bottlenecks one at a time, focused on resiliency and productivity of U.S. industry and labor force.

The Big Picture Look

As illustrated by the following (rather complex) graphic, 11 periods of inflationary bouts can be identified over a 68 year time frame from 1954 to present. Across the full timeline, corresponding metrics of annual CPI inflation, the effective Federal Funds rate and unemployment rate are depicted.

Source: FRED data of the St. Louis Federal Reserve for all graphics of this blog and associated analysis. The above graph encompasses monthly data points with CPI inflation and unemployment rates seasonally adjusted — together with the effective federal funds rate. Inflation cycles are illustrated by portions of the graph with blue background. Each period begins with an uptick in annual CPI (from the prior month) and ends following a subsequent month of peak unemployment.

The longest inflationary cycle noted covers a 10+ year the period extending from April 1959 to December 1970 — with modest inflation over about half of this time frame, accelerating thereafter. The shortest inflationary run-up followed by unemployment peaking occurs over a 26-month period from August 2007 to October 2009 through the Great Recession of 2007-09.

Demand-Driven Inflation

Of the 11 inflationary periods identified, six appear to have been driven primarily by excess demand in the U.S. economy — outstripping normalized productive supply capacity. Perhaps the poster child of this type of inflation and resulting Fed response is illustrated by the 2004-07 latter portion of the era known as the Great Moderation, including passing of the Fed baton from then Chair Alan Greenspan to Ben Bernanke.

As shown by the following chart, this was a time of sustained low unemployment (trending down from less than 6% to arrive closer to 4%) and of moderate annual CPI increases (ranging from less than 2% up to just nearly 5%, then dropping back down). This is also the one historical period over which the Fed methodically and systematically moved up its federal funds rates — starting at 1% in May 2004, increasing step-by-step (averaging about a 0.17% point increase per month) to just over 5% by June 2006.

Note: Areas shaded in gray at the left and right edges of the graph indicate rates in the month just before and then just after the period which is the focus of this time period.

This mechanistic approach to Fed intervention appeared to have worked remarkably well over the period in question. The Fed intervened to successfully choke off inflation that peaked in September 2005 without adversely affecting employment for American workers. In fact, the unemployment rate actually declined.

However, subsequent history has been less kind to Mr. Greenspan. Within a few months of this inflationary cycle, accommodative Fed policy (and subprime mortgage lending) would give way to the Great Recession of 2007-09. In short, monetary policy reliant on federal fund rates on its own proved inadequate to address the financial and economic tsunami just ahead. Structural and regulatory reform was also needed but despite advance warning did not arrive in time.

There are five other periods of demand-driven inflation that warrant briefly reviewing:

  • The affluent society period of bi-partisan goodwill during the 2nd term of the earlier Eisenhower Administration with continued post-war recovery including a baby boom that increased demand for consumer services, suburbanization and interstate freeway investment across the U.S. Inflationary pressures emerged in 1957 but were not adequately matched by monetary tightening, leading to recession in 1958 with accompanying near doubling of unemployment.

  • The guns and butter era of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as one of the longest periods of economic growth but with fiscal tightening ultimately needed to fund Vietnam War deficits and with federal funds rates increasing to the 9% level accompanied by resulting recession and unemployment in 1969-70.

  • A period of elevated but stable unemployment with double-dip recession in the Ford-Carter era of 1976-80 with rising inflation matched by similarly aggressive increases in Fed funds rates to an all-time high rate level reaching nearly 18% — albeit with only minor changes in the already elevated U.S. unemployment rate over this period.

  • A nearly 6-year portion of the Reagan-Bush era extending from late 1986 to mid 1992 with transition of Fed Chair from Paul Volker to Alan Greenspan — during which Fed fund rates increased to about 10% to address rising inflation but with relatively stable unemployment maintained until the early 1990s as interest rates ultimately proved to be held too high for too long.

  • And finally, the portion of the Obama presidency from late 2010 to mid 2012 as the Fed maintained unprecedented accommodative monetary policy of nearly 0% interest with recovery from the Great Recession and slowly declining unemployment from about 10% to 8% and with inflation briefly doubling up to the 4% level then back to 2% (a reflection of continuing post-recession labor force slack in the economy).

Supply-Side Inflation

Less appreciated but important for this current inflationary bout is the potential significance of supply-side inflation. This can be driven by factors ranging from supply chain gaps (as with increased delays in shipments) to workforce availability not adequate to meet employer needs. In many but not all cases, supply-side inflation occurs unexpectedly from external shocks as with the war in Ukraine with resultant production curtailments on globally important supplies ranging from petroleum products to critical food supplies (as with grains).

Of 11 inflationary experiences documented since WWII, five appear to involve clear supply-driven shortages leading to increased pricing. Perhaps the classic case of supply-side inflation occurred with the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74. The effects on CPI, Federal funds response and resulting economic performance (as measured by unemployment) are illustrated by the following graph.

The oil crisis took hold in October 1973 when OPEC members led by Saudi Arabia enacted an oil embargo on nations that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War. By the end of the embargo in March 1974 the price of oil had risen by nearly 300% globally, more in the U.S.

Inflationary pressures were already being felt on the U.S. economy and by late 1974 the U.S. CPI had increased by 12.2% over prior year levels. The Federal Reserve moved quickly and aggressively in an attempt to quell this unprecedented inflationary spiral, raising the Federal funds rate to a peak of 12.9% as of July 1974. Inflation eventually did come down, but with significant reductions not apparent until early 1975.

Unemployment rates went from about 6% to 9%, before finally starting to drop in May 1975, about 1-1/2 years after the embargo had been placed.

Fed action is clearly warranted with demand-driven inflation. However, in this instance, with inflation almost totally supply-driven, the Fed’s reliance on increasing interest rates seems clearly misplaced. Fed actions served to increase interest rates and unemployment — an unnecessary double blow to the American economy and with little direct effect on oil price inflation. With some recognition as to the limitations of a monetary response, the economic blow was further compounded by the imposition of wage and price controls by the Nixon Administration. The result was the worst of all worlds — stagflation persisting with subsequent and renewed economic crises into the early 1980s.

There are four other instances identified of inflation involving a significant supply-side component. However, these are somewhat more perplexing to unravel as demand factors also came into play — increasing the challenge of finding and executing an appropriate, effective policy response. These four other supply-side inflationary episodes are briefly outlined as follows:

  • The dot-com bubble and 9-11 attacks of 2000 reflect the combined effects of demand- and supply-driven inflation — with inflation going from about 1-1/2% in early 1998 to a peak annualized rate of 3.76% as of March 2000 — remaining at elevated levels into early 2001. Fed funds rates increased somewhat from less than 5% to 6.5% before quickly dropping as inflation subsided but with some relatively modest and on-going increase of about 2% points in nation-wide unemployment rates.

  • The period of the 2007-09 Great Recession was kicked-of by a doubling of the inflation rate from the range of 2% to 4% between August and November 2007 with inflation further peaking at 5.5% as of July 2008. Due to the collapse of credit (affecting homeowners, businesses and banks), the Fed lowered interest rates continuously throughout this period, going from a Fed funds rate of over 5% as of August 2008 down to 0.12% by October 2009. Unemployment increased from 4.6% to 10% over the same period. This clearly was a case where the federal funds rate was largely irrelevant to combat inflation; shrinking consumer demand coupled with financial instability is what made the transition to a lower inflation environment possible.

  • The experience of 2015 to mid 2019 yielded different outcomes with both demand and supply factors driving inflation. Fiscal stimulus factored in during the Obama administration followed by both supply-side deregulation and protectionist policies with Trump’s presidency (pre-pandemic). CPI inflation increased from less than 1% to nearly 3% by early 2017, dropped to 2% before returning to the 3% range by summer 2018 and back to 2% or less by early 2019. Throughout this period, fed interest rate policy was mildly restrictive with the federal funds rate going from near zero to about 2.4%. Unemployment declined from less than 6% to under 4% — clearly an example of the monetary policies of Janet Yellen and then Jerome Powell to generate low target rates of inflation while also facilitating robust employment growth.

  • Finally, the current time period of May 2020 to present reflects the sequential effects of the COVID pandemic followed by fiscal stimulus and pandemic recovery leading to resurgent inflation starting in early 2021, plateauing briefly in the 6% range as of Summer 2021 then going to peak levels of 9% year-over-year inflation by mid 2022 — with the demand driver of fiscal stimulus now further complicated by supply bottlenecks related to energy, supply chain management and workforce availability. Federal monetary policy remained extraordinarily accommodative at nearly zero federal funds rates until Spring 2022. Unemployment has continued to drop to an historically low 3-4% range. As illustrated by the following graph, this represents a case where the Fed maintained interest rates too low for too long — perhaps missing the more appropriate tightening window by as much as a year.

Note: This graph may be updated periodically to represent changing current conditions.

With this experience providing the background context, the question now on the table is: Might the Fed now make matters worse by going from too accommodative to too restrictive?

Metrics Anyone?

Looking back over nearly 70 years of experience, it is fairly clear that the management of interest rates (specifically fund rates) by the Federal Reserve has been fairly idiosyncratic — depending on the economic philosophy and predilections of Fed Chairs and Governors of each era in addressing widely varied economic conditions.

The Federal Reserve Act mandates that the Federal Reserve conduct monetary policy "so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." Even though the act lists three distinct goals of monetary policy, the Fed's mandate for monetary policy generally boils down to a dual mandate of maximum employment as one mandate and with stable prices plus moderate long-term interest rates as a second mandate.

However, in practice the first stated goal of maximum employment consistently takes a back seat to the job for which the Fed has the most experience — managing inflation and setting interest rates. In effect, acceptable employment (or unemployment) levels may fluctuate up or down as a residual resulting from Fed actions aimed primarily to address price stability and interest rates.

What can be determined is that there are substantial differences that accompany demand- versus supply-driven (or combined) conditions for inflation. On the one hand, the Fed has been prepared to more aggressively ratchet up interest rates in demand-driven periods of inflation. On the other hand, the Fed has also been willing to accept higher levels of unemployment to combat supply-driven (or supply plus demand-influenced) inflation.

Trough to peak rates of unemployment increase by nearly double in supply- and combined periods of inflation as occurs during demand-only inflationary run-ups. This may be occurring because the Fed has useful monetary tools to address the demand side of inflation but little in its tool-kit to address supply-driven inflation.

This peaking phenomenon is somewhat offset by the duration of the period over which increased unemployment is experienced. Demand-driven inflation tends to be resolved over a longer duration than is the case with supply-driven (or combined demand-supply) bouts of inflation. In large part, this is because supply issues which generally are externally generated tend to be resolved more quickly once the embargo or supply chain issue(s) at hand are addressed (whether privately or publicly). The exception is labor force availability — a supply constraint likely to persist over a longer term due to rapidly changing demographics of the American workforce.

So, How is Current Inflation to be Resolved?

At the outset, it is critical to understand that the current inflation reflects both demand- and supply-driven dynamics:

  • The demand-side of the current price run-up is due to a multiplicity of pandemic and post-pandemic factors largely centered on significant fiscal stimulus creating demand for goods and services that exceed realistic productive capacities — especially in the face of recovery from the COVID pandemic. These conditions are readily understood by the Fed and are addressable by monetary tightening, notably by increasing interest rates to reduce borrowing demand (albeit at the added potential expense of a hard landing with renewed unemployment).

  • The supply-side of inflation is not so readily addressable with existing Fed tools. Some issues ranging from supply-chain shortages and bottlenecks are likely to be ultimately self-resolving through actions of multiple private actors seeing opportunity for added profit at the margin. Other issues may be of longer duration as with reduced work force (due to retiring baby boomers) or commodity and energy supply constraints (catalyzed by the Ukraine conflict and by public policy resistance to increased domestic fuels investment and production).


Perhaps the best metric readily available to identify and quantify effects of supply-side inflation is provided by data regarding productivity of the U.S. workforce. Over the last decade, American productivity has increased by an average of 1.3% per year. However, in 2022 productivity has gone negative to a low of a negative 2.0% year-over-year (decline) as of the 2nd quarter of 2022 — an indicator of how supply bottlenecks and wage increases are putting upward pressure on inflation.


The greatest risk now facing the Fed is the temptation to go for broke to reduce both demand- and supply-side inflation — albeit primarily reliant on the monetary tools most readily available at its disposal. A more practical approach is to take on the demand-driven forces via higher interest rates while recognizing that supply-side issues need to be addressed primarily through other (non-Fed) means.

In the short-term, this may mean living with reduced but above recently experienced rates of inflation until supply-side issues can be addressed one-at-a-time. Public-private cooperative initiative is pivotal for this to happen sooner than later:

  • Recognizing that workforce shortages may remain front-and-center over this decade (and perhaps beyond), key productivity steps are to encourage automation of low-skill/low wage jobs allowing more workers to migrate up the career ladder — also to pursue skills-based in-migration policies.

  • Aligning public policy to encourage more U.S. fuels production for domestic and export use as a short-term expedient until carbon-free technologies prove capable of fully scaling up for replacement of fossil fuels — also allowing reasonable time frames for return on investment to avoid becoming encumbered by stranded, productivity-sapping energy assets.

  • Stabilizing mortgage rate increases to allow for valuation adjustments that will allow home buying to renormalize — also encouraging renewed construction to better meet pent-up demand — especially for family-forming millennials. As the full effects of rate increases to date likely will be somewhat delayed until the spring 2023 typical seasonal uptick in market demand, there is value in waiting to see how home sales and valuations are adjusting before further pursuing continued aggressive interest rate hikes. Letting the market adjust incrementally is preferable to effecting a market crash from which recovery will be more difficult.

Bottom-line, the risk of the current unexpected inflation is the slippery slope toward persistent stagflation — of weakened economic activity coupled with unending cost of living erosion. Getting through this period requires use but not abuse of monetary tools within the purview of the Federal Reserve — coupled with fiscal tools of state and federal governments and the private sector working in partnership for a more productive and inclusive America.

If there is an example to avoid, it would be the Fed’s overly aggressive and relatively ineffective attempt to beat down a OPEC-driven supply-side inflation with demand suppressive tools of the Federal Reserve as experienced during the Nixon Administration. Monetary tools proved ineffective to corral inflation and the nation paid an unnecessarily high economic price with unemployment increasing from 3% to 9%.

In today’s situation: Until CPI inflation shows clear signs of easing, the Fed is justified to continue moving interest rates further upward — systematically and cautiously. in short, slow the rate of fed funds rate increases to a pace allowing for easier and incremental market adjustments — avoiding a hard landing that could unnecessarily imperil U.S. economic prosperity and equitable outcomes for years to come.

LABOR FORCE DEEP DIVE (Part 2)

In my last blog of September 15, Part 1 analysis inovlved a one-decade look-back at labor force and jobs, focusing in on declining labor force participation pre- and post-pandemic. For those who missed the introductory overview of Part 1, you might click here to see the earlier post.

Now with Part 2, we dive a bit deeper. Topics covered include:

  • A state-by-state overview of labor force participation — currently and over the last decade,
    followed by consideration of participation rates by

  • Age of adult population and other pertinent characteristics as for sex, race/ethnicity and children at home,
    ending with

  • The elephant outside the room
    and what to do??

Part 1 focused on the question of getting labor force participation rates back up to where they were a decade ago. This Part 2 posts observes that, even if successful, recovery of labor force participation likely will solve only about 25-30% of the current labor shortage. And the even more unwelcome news is that as long as the workforce supply gap persists, inflationary pressures will also continue.

Let’s get started.

State-by-State Review

This state-by-state review starts with a mapped look at comparative labor force participation rates as of 2021. As shown, Nebraska comes in as #1 — with a labor force participation rate estimated at 70.2% of working age adults age 16+. Other states in the top 5 are North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado and Utah. respectively. Rocky Mountain and plains states leading the way.

At the bottom of the list is West Virginia with a labor force participation rate of less than 55% — followed by Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and New Mexico. Interestingly, the states both at the top and bottom rungs of workforce participation tend to be rural or with large rural expanses.

Perhaps more noteworthy is a second pass at the map — this time for a comparison of changes in labor force participation from before the pandemic (2019) to recent recovery experience (2021). Somewhat surprisingly, Oregon comes in #1 — increasing its labor force participation rate by 0.7% points from 2019-21. Only one other state — Alaska — has experienced increasing labor force participation over this pre- to recovering pandemic period.

Forty-eight states have experienced declining labor force participation since 2019. Vermont comes in 50th with a 5.9% point decline in labor force participation in just two years — followed by Connecticut, Nevada, Iowa and Virginia also losing significant workforce participation. There appears to be no immediately clear sense of what, if any, characteristics that these states share in common that would explain their uniformly weak recovery experience.

Labor Force Participation by Age

We now take on perhaps the most intriguing characterization of labor force participation — by age of worker over the full period of January 2012 - August 2022. At first blush, there is little that would seem out of the ordinary as depicted by the following graph.

Not surprisingly, the three age cohorts with, by far, the highest labor force participation rates are those in career building age categories of 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54 — all with participation rates in the range of about 80-85% of the populations in their respective age cohorts.

Those age 55-64 show some dis-attachment from the work force — with workforce participation rates dropping to the 65% +/- range. Entry level workers age 16-24 have yet lower participation rates in the range of 55% (with large proportions still in school).

And not surprisingly, those age 65+ show the least continuing attachment in the range of 20% or lower participation rates. We’ll circle back to this cohort in a moment — for the rest of the story.

All age cohorts experienced some temporary loss of workforce participation during the pandemic but with general recovery thereafter. Although workforce participation for all adults declined by 1.3% points from 2012-22, participation increased for every single age cohort 16 and over — with the greatest increase of 2.1% points over the decade noted for those age 25-34.

How can it be that participation declines for the overall population age 16+ but increases for every age cohort from 16-24 to 65+ (and all those in-between)? The rest of the story answer lies with the outsize cohort of aging and retiring baby boomers. Put succinctly, the number of baby boomers now retiring far outweighs the number of new labor force participants age 16-64.

Other Defining Characteristics?

Before getting to this story’s conclusion and its implications, it is also useful to consider other characteristics of labor force participation — including sex, race/ethnicity and presence or absence of children at home.

Sex & Labor Force Participation

As has long been the case, men continue to have higher rates of labor force participation than women. However, that is changing. Over the 2012-22 period, an average of just under 69% of men age 16+ were in the labor force as compared with close to 57% of women. However, over this period, men’s participation rate declined by 2.4% points while that of women declined by just 0.6% points.

Influence of Race/Ethnicity

With a labor force participation rate of over 66%, Hispanic/Latino adults are the most work oriented, followed by those who identify as White at just under 63% and African American/Black at between 61-62%. Over the course of the last decade, the Black participation rate has increased by 0.7% points — above that of Latinos (up by 0.5% points) and then Whites (for whom participation rates dropped by 2.1% points).

Presence/Absence of Children @ Home

Contrary to what one might expect, households with their own children (under 18) at home tend to have higher rates of labor force participation than those with no children in the household. Over the last decade, labor force participation rates averaged 81% for households with children versus 57% for those with no children at home (likely due in large part to being at or closer to retirement than for those with no children present in the household).

Also surprisingly, parents with children under 6 years of age are almost as likely to be in the workforce as those with older children. In the last decade, labor force participation has increased for households with children while declining for households with no children.

This shift has affected even households with very young children (less than 1 year of age). For example, over the last decade labor force participation rates for women with a youngest child under 1 year has increased by 5.3% points, the most significant change for any of the child/parent indicators tracked by BLS.

The Elephant Just Outside the Room

For the past several decades, the baby boom generation (born between 1946 and 1964) has been the elephant in the room — supporting strong growth in labor force and employment. Now the elephant is leaving the room — with only those born between 1957 and 1964 still at or under 65 years of age.

Those who are over 65 seem to be following in their parents footsteps — with labor force participation rates dropping from 73-74% (for those 65 and under) to 19% or less (for those now over 65 years of age). The boomer elephant is now leaving the room — with generally smaller generational cohorts coming in behind.

The following graph compares changes in the distribution of the nation’s population and labor force over the last decade. As illustrated, persons age 65+ accounted for 73% of the growth in the nation’s population (of those 16 and over) from 2012-22. Despite ensuing dis-attachment of many due to retirements, this senior cohort still accounted for more than one-third (34%) of the U.S. net labor force growth over this last decade. Who’s to fill the gap after boomers move into their 80s (now just four years away for those born in 1946)?

Source: U.S. BLS.

Those age 55-64 (including some younger baby boomers) also accounted for more growth in labor force than in population. And those age 25-44 (largely millennials) have contributed both to added population and even more to the nation’s labor force.

The situation is more challenging for the much smaller Generation X cohort as illustrated by the age 45-54 group on the graph. From 2012-22, both the shares of population and labor force of those age 45-54 declined. And the contribution those at the youngest (16-24) end of the age spectrum has been essentially flat — providing no net added contribution to American workforce over this past decade.

My earlier Part 1 analysis of labor force trends indicates there are about 2.3 million fewer Americans either working or looking for work than would have been the case if labor force participation rates of 2012 were still in place. This Part 2 analysis shows that the challenge is even more intense than just loss of historic rates of labor force participation.

This Part 2 review indicates that America’s labor force increased by about 10.3 million from 2012-22. The number of jobs increased even more dramatically — by 18.8 million — with the difference due primarily to reductions in unemployment to record lows. However, this came at a price. Labor force growth fell short of the job increase by 8.5 million.

With historically low unemployment, the slack in the nation’s workforce is now essentially used up. Going forward, net growth in employment is likely to depend on something more like a 1:1 ratio of labor force to job growth (versus the 0.55:1 ratio) on which the U.S. economy relied over the last decade.

With the previous slack used up coupled with weakened demographics of population aging and resulting slower workforce growth ahead, there are few ready-made solutions on the horizon. So, what to do?

What To Do?

Looking ahead, there appear to be two possible strategic responses to the impending transformation of America’s job engine, either by:

  • Increasing workforce supply
    and/or

  • Reducing workforce demand

Here are some thoughts as to potential policies or implementation measures that might be employed for each of the two broad strategic approaches considered.

Increasing Workforce Supply

Increasing workforce supply could involve some combination of potential measures including:

  • Attracting back the estimated 2.3 million workers who appear to have left the labor force over the last decade — both before and during the pandemic — likely involving some combination of measures such as better pay, more flexible work hours and at-home work, supportive child care, health safety protections (as for immuno-compromised), and better articulated opportunities for on-the-job training and career advancement
    (though best case, this measure on its own solves only about 25-30% of the labor force/job mismatch).

  • Increasing birth rates — though it will take a generation (about 20 years) to realize the payoff.

  • Increasing part-time, contractual and volunteer work opportunity for those preparing to retire — focused both on those currently in the 55-64 and 65+ age cohorts.

  • Providing more flexible work options for market segments with historically low rates of participation — as for parents with young children

  • Encouraging in-migration — especially for those bringing skills in short supply into the U.S. and by offering clearer path for longer term stays and citizenship

Strategies for increasing workforce supply offer the best opportunity for success if accompanied by reasonable social and political consensus for continued U.S. population and economic growth with ever greater cultural diversity.

Reducing Workforce Demand

Strategies for reducing workforce demand are dependent on transitioning to a society that can do more with less through measures such as:

  • Induce recession with increased unemployment as the Federal Reserve is clearly poised to risk — but this is only a short-term (and rather painful) solution for the duration of the economic downturn.

  • Greatly ramped up investment in automation and robotization — especially for employment sectors involving rote work or lower paid service occupations (offset by new found worker opportunity to upgrade by transitioning to occupations that pay more)

  • Reducing the accepted work week from the traditional 8 hours/day, 5 days/week schedule — as the benefits made possible by a more affluent society allow opportunities for more time for societal leisure and independent personal pursuits

  • Parallel adoption of some form of universal basic income (UBI) providing all Americans with a base level of compensation — adequate for day-to-day needs accompanied by incentives whereby working is always more remunerative than not (though if improperly applied this measure could exacerbate employment woes by increasing rather than reducing demand for goods and services)

  • Simplifying rules-based and means-tested administrative and revenue mechanisms so there is less need for employment bureaucracies and enforcement in both public and private spheres of economic activity

  • Investing in technology platforms readily accessible in the full range of personal, social and economic pursuits

Strategies for reducing labor demand may prove challenging to achieve widespread public and institutional acceptance. However, if adopted, strategies aimed to right-size the scale of human effort required in a more widely affluent society offer prospective benefits of greater individual, community and cultural choice for generations to come.

Most likely, the strategic mix pursued will involve some combination of supply enhancement and demand reduction measures — involving both market led and regulatory initiatives coupled with trial and error, rewarding and building on what’s demonstrated to work.

The not-so-fortunate reality is that the workforce supply gap is not likely to be solved overnight. As long as it persists, upward inflationary pressure also will continue — independent of actions the Federal Reserve may take in the here and now. All the more reason to begin addressing the longer term labor supply gap — the sooner the better.

LABOR FORCE DEEP DIVE (Part 1)

What’s happened to American workforce? Where have the workers gone? Along with inflation, these questions have become top of mind challenges across the U.S. — the new economic challenges post-COVID-19 pandemic.

While there’s as yet no silver bullet answer, this might be a good time to sift through the detail, piecing together the mosaic. This blog is intended to graphically and succinctly characterize the changing nature of labor force participation over the last decade. This is Part 1 of a 2-part blog post with this Part 1 providing:

  • Introduction - a one-decade look-back at labor force and jobs

  • Review - declining labor force participation

  • Summary - reduced workforce by the numbers

Note: All data used for this post is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), based on monthly records extending back over this past decade.

A One-Decade Lookback @ Labor Force & Jobs

In January 2012, the U.S. had a total labor force of over 154 million with total seasonally adjusted employment of 141-142 million. Just over a decade later, as of August 2022 the nation’s labor force had increased to nearly 165 million with 159 million employed.

Looks like great progress. Well, not quite. We all know something is amiss. So get ready for a quick deep dive into the numbers.

What we see is that declining labor force participation has been an emerging trend going back over at least the last decade. And that the pandemic together with incomplete workforce recovery served to accelerate and intensify a now readily apparent shortage.

As shown by the following graph, despite the sharp but temporary downturn of the 2020-21 pandemic, America’s labor force is now 6% above 2012 levels and employment an even healthier 12-13% above pre-pandemic levels. The concern is with a decline in labor force participation which has been reduced from from as much as 63.8% to 62.4% of the civilian population age 16+ (as of August 2022).

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Monthly employment and labor force data for persons age 16+ is seasonally adjusted.

From 2012 - February 2020, employment across the U.S. had increased by 11.5%, nearly double the 6.4% increase in available labor force over the same time period. Existing slack was removed from the labor force as unemployment was reduced from 8.3% in January 2012 to a below normalized rate of 3.5% as of February 2020 (just prior to intrusion of the pandemic).

What’s remarkable about the 2020-21 pandemic is the exacerbating effect that temporary layoffs had on the labor force. From March - April 2022, over 25.5 million jobs were cut from employer payrolls. And about 8.2 million Americans exited the labor force, at least temporarily not seeking work. In effect, nearly one-third of massive pandemic layoffs were accompanied by persons leaving the labor force altogether.

With initial recovery in the summer of 2020, a good portion of these jobs were recovered quickly — with the U.S. back to full job recovery (to pre-pandemic employment) as of late summer 2022.

However, labor force recovery has continued to lag well behind job growth. Over the full time frame from January 2012 to August 2022, U.S. employment has increased by 12.8%, still about double the 6.6% increase in labor force. What’s particularly notable is the pattern of the recovery from April 2020 - August 2022 — with available labor force up by 5.3% versus an employment gain (or recovery) of 17.6% (meaning an even wider gap between workforce supply and demand)..

Re-entry of discouraged or marginalized workers occurred more slowly — lagging well behind employment growth. This has led to current low unemployment rates and to increased competition for an increasingly constrained labor pool — especially among lower-paid service workers.

Declining Labor Force Participation

So, what’s the worry?

As illustrated by the graph below, the concern is with the short and potentially longer-term effects of a decline in labor force participation which has eroded, starting slowly then abruptly, over about the last 10 years.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Participation rates as a % of civilian population age 16+ are seasonally adjusted.

After peaking at a decade high 63.8% in October 2012, labor force participation rates began to trend downward — dropping to a pre-pandemic low of 62.3% as of September 2015. Participation rates then edged upward (somewhat erratically) to a new peak of 63.4% in February 2020.

Employment and labor force both crashed in the following two months. As the COVID pandemic took hold, America’s labor force participation cratered to 60.2% of the adult population by April 2020.

As employment recovered over the summer of 2020 and then more slowly thereafter, a portion of those who had dropped out of the workforce re-entered. But with not nearly the level of work attachment as the nation was accustomed to pre-pandemic.

As of August 2022, labor force participation has now reached a post-pandemic high of 62.4%. However, this is still well below the pre-pandemic high of 63.8%. And while a 1.4% point difference between the high and low participation rate may seem relatively trivial, this difference equates to a cumulative loss of 2.3 million workers over this approximate 10-year period.

It’s increasingly questionable as to whether workforce participation ever get backs to prior the strong levels of a decade back. This appears to be for two primary reasons:

  • Retirements of aging baby-boomers,
    coupled with

  • Some declining attachment of younger age adults to work
    (with seemingly multiple explanations)

Reduced Workforce by the Numbers

I’ll come back to more detailed discussion of reasons for declining labor force participation in Part 2 of this blog post. We’ll dive even deeper into the numbers looking at:

  • State-by-state experience

  • Labor force participation by worker age and sex

  • Variations by race and ethnicity

  • Children at home

I close this Part 1 post with two quick summary observations — by the numbers. First, from 2012 up to the pandemic, labor force participation across America experienced some overall slow erosion — with at least 800,000 fewer Americans in the workforce at the start of the pandemic than in 2012. So, the beginnings of de-attachment for some workers has been in the works for some time.

Second, reduced labor force participation accelerated during the pandemic. Even with some recovery through to this August, America’s workforce has been reduced by another 1.5 million. In effect, the life and livelihood altering pandemic appears to have accelerated and intensified a trend already underway.

The net result is that, today, there are about 2.3 million fewer Americans either working or looking for work than a decade ago.

Where do we go from here? Look for a Part 2 installment - now available (click here to view).

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